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1 Defending Against Next Generation Attacks Through Net-
work/Endpoint Collaboration and Interaction
(Define 1 or 2 difficult problems (research challenges)
Over the past few years we have seen the use of Internet worms, i.e., malicious self-
replicating programs, as a mechanism to rapidly invade and compromise large numbers of
remote computers. Although the first worms released on the Internet were large-scale easy-
to-spot massive security incidents [MSB02, MPS+03, SM04, BCJ+05b], also known as flash
worms [SMPW04], it is currently envisioned that future worms will be increasingly difficult
to detect, and will be known as stealth worms [SPW02]. This is partly because the motives of
the first worm developers were centered around the self gratification brought by the achieve-
ment of compromising large numbers of remote computers, the motives of recent worm and
malware developers are centered around financial and political gains. Therefore, although
recent attackers still want to be able to control a large number of compromised computers,
they prefer to compromise these computers as quietly as possible, over a longer period of time,
so as not to be detected by any security defenses. Thus, to achieve a stealthy behavior, these
attackers have started using, or at least have the capacity to use a wide variety of mechanisms
that will make their worms more difficult to detect. Such mechanisms might include:
• Encryption. Attackers may communicate with the potential victim using a secure (en-
crypted) connection, making it difficult for network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
[Roe99, XCA+06] to spot their attempted attack.
• Metamorphism. The body of worms usually contains some initial code that will be
executed when the worm invades the victim computer. Metamorphism obfuscates this
code by adding various instructions to it, and/or by substituting blocks of instructions
with equivalent blocks of other instructions [SF01]. In this way two “copies” of the
worm would be completely different from each other confusing worm detection systems
which depend their effectiveness on the fact the all copies of a worm are practically
identical [SEVS04, KK04, AAM05].
• Polymorphism. Polymorphic approaches obfuscate the worm’s body by encoding it
and prepending a decoder. When propagating, the worm mutates its body so that
two “copies” of the worm would look completely different from each other (modulo the
body of the encoder) [Szö05, DUMU03, K201]. Much like metamorphic approaches,
polymorphic systems confuse worm detection systems which depend their effectiveness
on the fact the all copies of a worm are practically identical [SEVS04, KK04, AAM05].
• Hit Lists. The first versions of recent worms selected their victims completely ran-
domly, i.e., by generating a random IP address in the range 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255.
It has been proposed however, that worms may be more effective if they first cre-
ate a hitlist of all vulnerable computers and then attack only computers in the hitlist
[SPW02, AAMA05]. This hithist may even be filtered to exclude honeypots 1. Armed
with a hitlist, a worm is able to compromise a number of vulnerable computers gener-
1A honeypot is a computer waiting to be attacked. Once attacked, the honeypot records as much information
as possible so that the security administrators will be able to characterize the attack and generate a signature
for it.
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ating the minimum amount of traffic possible, evading detection mechanisms based on
visible traffic anomalies.
• Hybrid Worms. Traditional worms used to invade computers by exploiting vulnera-
bilities of applications listening for Internet connections. However, as more and more
computers are hidden behind firewalls and do not listen for incoming Internet con-
nections, they are theoretically protected from such types of attacks. However, to
compromise computers protected behind firewalls, worm developers may exploit sev-
eral different invasion paths including, infected email attachments, infected files shared
through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, and infected files accessed through locally shared
disks [KE03]. In this way, an attack may enter an organization as an email attachment,
may spread to individual departments through infected disk shares, and may jump from
department to department through traditional remote procedure calls.
• Defense Mapping. Many of the proposed (and deployed) techniques for detecting and
countering new attacks use honeypots as the early warning system [Spi03, DQG+04,
YBP04, CBMM04, BCJ+05a, RMT05, MVS01]. However, recent work has shown that
attackers can exploit certain features and aspects of a honeypot’s behavior to identify
and avoid such detectors [BFV05, SII05, RMT06]. Combined with hitlists, this can
render worms (especially slow-spreading ones) and other automated attacks virtually
undetectable.
• Client-side Attacks. In the past year (2005–2006), we have seen an increase in the
use of zero-day attacks aimed at client software (especially browsers, but also various
types of document viewers such as Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint, and Adobe
Acrobat). Other than stand-alone, host-based intrusion detection/prevention mecha-
nisms (such as virus scanners), very little has been done in hardening vulnerable client
systems.
1.1 Impact of failing to solve the problem
(For each problem, describe the impact of solving or failing to solve the problem and a description of
specific challenges making the problem difficult)
Compromised computers can be used to cause harm to third parties or even to cause harm
to their traditional owners.
• Attacks to third parties. Recent worm writers organize compromised computers
into botnets, i.e., armies of hosts which are primarily used for malicious acts including
launching of DOS attacks, blackmailing, sending of SPAM mail, click fraud, theft of
intellectual property, and even identity theft. One would envision that botnets in the
future could be used for political purposes as well.
• Attacks to the owners of compromised computers. A compromised computer
can be used to steal the private data and the identity of the owner of the computer.
Once, however, ordinary users start to realize the dangers of a compromised computer,
they will probably get increasingly less inclined to trust their computers for financial
transactions as well as private communications. This will probably impede the adoption
of the information society and may eventually reduce its overall spread and impact.
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1.2 Research Directions
(Provide potential research directions for handling the problem, and metrics for measuring progress
against the problem. Possibly, describe also the limitations of current approaches, promising approaches
not yet fully explored and desirable approaches where relatively few ideas have been proposed.)
Over the last five years there has been significant research in the area of detection and
containment of cyberattacks. Indeed, we believe that we have currently reached the point
where it is possible to detect rapidly spreading and massively parallel flash worms. However,
it is unclear whether we have the complete technical knowledge or the deployed mechanisms in
order to detect and contain stealth attacks. Using a combination of the techniques described
earlier, such attacks can become invisible (or at least very difficult to detect) to network-based
defenses.
Our view is that such attacks can only be detected via large-scale collaboration among
end-hosts: by exchanging and correlating relevant information, it is possible to identify slow
and stealthy attacks, and to take appropriate measures to defend against them, or at least
quarantine those nodes that appear to have been compromised. Specifically, we believe that
it is increasingly important to include home and small business computers in the attack-
detection process. These computers are increasingly becoming the primary targets of most
attackers. Therefore, including them in the worm detection process will increase the chances
of worm detection. Exemplifying a large range of access patterns and a large range of ap-
plications, these computers typically tend to have more representative configurations than
the traditional honeypots currently being used in worm detection. Furthermore, ordinary
computers being used by their regular owners are more difficult to be categorized as honey-
pots and to be avoided by future attacks. The inclusion, however, of home computers in the
detection process, should (1) guarantee the safety of the end computer and (2) the minimum
possible intrusion in the ordinary use of the computer.
On the other hand, we are not completely discounting network-based defenses: rather, we
believe that such defenses must be integrated with end-host defenses. In the past, network
and end-host security were viewed as two distinct areas that were meant to complement each
other but kept separate. While this allowed for a clean separation between the respective
security mechanisms, it also meant that the potential of both was stunted. Furthermore,
by keeping them isolated, it was (and is) impossible to exploit scale for defensive purposes.
Exploiting scale is something that attackers have learned to do well, as evidenced by such
phenomena as distributed denial of service attacks, self-propagating worms and botnets.
The industry is beginning to follow such an approach, albeit in a fragmented, ad hoc
fashion. For example, several enterprises exchange alert and IDS logs through sites such as
DShield.org; anti-virus vendors with extensive presence on the desktop are correlating infor-
mation about application behavior from thousands of hosts; network security and monitoring
companies perform similar correlation using network traces and distributed blackholes (hon-
eypots). To the extend that such approaches are being explored, they seem largely confined
to the realm of information gathering. This also largely seems to be the situation with the
DoD and the various agencies. For example, DARPA is currently funding the Application
Communities effort, which seeks to leverage large software monocultures to distribute the task
of attack monitoring — again, an approach confined to the end-host. Previous work (notably
in the DARPA OASIS program) looked into the space of reactive security, but only considered
small-scale environments. Arguably, we need to extend the reach of our collaboration-based
mechanisms to counter such pervasive threats as DDoS and botnets.
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Thus, we argue that it is important to transition into an network architecture design where
networks and end-hosts, in various combinations, can elect to collaborate and coordinate their
actions and reactions to better protect themselves (and, by implication, the network at large).
There are several research issues arising in such an environment, including:
• what problems are best addressed through a collaborative approach
• new mechanisms at all levels of the network architecture (routers, protocols, end-hosts,
processes, hardware) that are “collaboration friendly”
• metrics that quantify the security of collaborative approaches over non-collaborative
approaches
• who to trust, and to what extend
• how to prevent attacks that exploit such mechanisms, including insider threats
• command-and-control vs. loose-coupling mechanism composition
Furthermore, in an era of distributed software services (what is fashionably called ”Web
2.0”), no single application, node, or network has enough information to detect and counter
high-level semantic attacks, or even some of the more conventional web-based malware (e.g.,
cross-site scripting attacks). Large-scale distributed systems require large-scale distributed
defenses. This is particularly so within specific application domains (such as healthcare and
industrial SCADA control), where large-scale collaborative (but independent) defenses will
allow better control to critical information and resources.
2 Application-Level Reflection Attacks
(Define 1 or 2 difficult problems (research challenges)
Over the last few years we have seen an increase in the use of botnets, that is, compromised
computers being used by attackers for a wide variety of malicious purposes including sending
spam email, blackmailing targeted victims, and preventing victim computers from functioning.
Although we will continue to see the use of botnets in the near future, we also expect to
see the increasing exploitation of non-compromised computers for malicious acts. In this
scenario, attackers carefully trick non-compromised and possibly non-cooperative computers
into acting on behalf of the attackers. For example, in PuppetNets [LAAA06] it was shown
that attackers which control a web server may direct a large number of ordinary web clients
towards repeatedly requesting web pages from a victim computer. Made possible by the
intelligent use of Javascript, these repeated requests where completely transparent to the user
in front of the browser, who, all things being equal, did not see any malicious attack being
going on. Similarly, Athanasopoulos et al. showed that peers participating in the Gnutella file
sharing peer-to-peer network can be easily tricked into believing that a victim computer serves
a large number of popular files, which in turn, directed a large numbers of requests towards
the victim computer, possibly depleting it of its resources [AAM06]. Overnet, another real
world P2P system for file sharing, may also be abused in the same fashion [NR06]. Randal
Vaughn and Gadi Evron, in a preliminary work, published some techniques to use the DNS
[MD88] system as an amplification platform for Denial of Service attacks to third parties by
sending malcrafted DNS requests [VE06]. We believe that in the near future we will see an
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increasing number of such vulnerabilities which will make possible the use of a large number
of non-compromised and non-malicious computers into malicious activities.
We call the collective exploitation of these non-malicious clients Application-Level Reflec-
tion Attacks. As computer applications become increasingly diverse, such attacks may spill
beyond the traditional world of computers towards other networks, including, for example,
the telephone network. For example, by exploiting a number of Skype (or other Internet
telephony) clients, attackers may jam the telephone numbers and/or faxes of victim organi-
zations with bogus telephone calls. To make matters worse, jamming may also be directed
to organizations providing vital information services as well, precluding these organizations
from providing their service even at critical times. And, since this attack originates outside
the traditional telephone network, it might be difficult to trace the attackers back using tra-
ditional telecom-style traceback mechanisms. To make matters worse, even when the attack
is traced back, the last point in the trace may be a set of non-compromised computers tricked
into making these bogus telephone calls. Thus, attackers who have the power to selectively
clog a decent number of telephone lines, may use this power for blackmail, revenge, or even
to terrorize a selected subset of the population.
2.1 Impact of failing to solve the problem
(For each problem, describe the impact of solving or failing to solve the problem and a description of
specific challenges making the problem difficult)
As computers are interwoven within several other services in our society, computer security
problems diffuse into the general fabric of the society. Thus, a problem which originally
initiated in the cyberspace, may easily transcend into other spaces as well. For example,
although SPAM used to be a problem of people communicating via email, it is becoming
increasingly easier for SPAMers to make SPAM telephone calls, to send SPAM voice messages,
to send SPAM SMSes, to send SPAM MMSes, and in general to SPAM traditional low-
bandwidth communication channels using the efficiency, precision, and speed of modern digital
computers.
Such attacks can be used for several reasons including:
• Disrupting the operation of organizations who depend on reliable communication chan-
nels (e.g., telephones, mail, Internet). Such organizations may range from airline reser-
vation services to the friendly neighboring take out Chinese restaurant.
• Cyber-vandalism against neighborhoods or even towns by selectively clogging their com-
munication channels in a time of need.
• Intimidating, or even terrorizing, large numbers of people by clogging their telephone
access to local services such as hospitals, schools, etc.
2.2 Research Directions
(Provide potential research directions for handling the problem, and metrics for measuring progress
against the problem. Possibly, describe also the limitations of current approaches, promising approaches
not yet fully explored and desirable approaches where relatively few ideas have been proposed.)
The problem of Application-Level Reflection Attacks is relatively new and there exists
very little research in this direction. However, as the problem is getting better understood,
we envision research along the following lines:
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• Document the extent of the problem. At the time of this writing it is not clear
which systems can be inadvertently used for Application-Level Reflection Attacks.
• Document the impact of the problem. We need to develop scenarios which clearly
show what is the impact of the problem and what is the financial, social, and political
cost associated with it.
• Develop Detection Mechanisms. Since Application-Level Reflection Attacks consist
of non-compromised computers which behave in a seemingly normal way, we need to
develop sophisticated mechanisms for detecting them.
• Develop Defense Mechanisms. Once a malicious behavior is detected, we need to
have in place defense mechanisms which will block, or at least restrain this type of
attack. We envision defense mechanism both close to the host, as well as close to the
victim(s).
In closing, we believe that Application-Level Reflection Attacks show that it is technically
possible to attackers to perform major attacks against traditional services by manipulating the
behavior of a large number of non-compromised computers. Since these attacks involve non-
compromised computers, they may be more difficult to detect using traditional approaches,
and may deliver a more effective blow, especially when they spread into critical infrastructures,
such as the traditional telephone network.
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